View From the Hill
Written by Rep. Cliff Stearns (R-FL)
This Mission is Critical and Should Be Fully Funded.
The JCA was slated to fulfill the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force requirements for a medium-lift, intratheater airlift aircraft that supports the strategic, operational and tactical objectives of the joint force commander. In 2007, the department awarded the team comprising L-3 Integrated Systems and Alenia North America, with the C-27J aircraft, a firm, fixed-price contract for the procurement of the JCA.
The C-27J is a twin-engine turboprop with short takeoff and delivery capability that enables the commander to move missioncritical/ time-sensitive cargo to forward tactical units in remote and austere locations. The U.S. Army was scheduled to receive the JCA to replace the aging C-23 Sherpa; to relieve operational and maintenance pressure on their rotary wing fleet; and to reduce outsourced aviation support and ground convoys. The JCA was also slated to support the National Guard’s expanding homeland security mission and provide a cost-effective platform supporting U.S. Air Force theater-level logistics missions.
It is perplexing to see DoD reduce funding for one of the few programs that is performing on schedule and on budget. Even more so, the real mystery is why the department, after more than four years of rigorously defending the program, would suddenly take such drastic actions.
At the request of Congress and through its own deliberative decision-making process, the Department of Defense and other outside agencies have completed dozens of studies and internal reviews of the program. Many years of analysis went into establishing the requirements, but in testimony thus far, there is no indication that the same level of analysis went into the decision to adjust the program.
Even more mystifying is what pressure was applied to the U.S. Army to force them to essentially “give up the program.” It is well documented that the current intratheater airlift capability in the Army is insufficient to meet the demands of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the department is to offer a renewed emphasis on waging irregular warfare and counterinsurgency, which requires a focus on supporting smaller units across many locations, then the C-27J is an ideal platform.
Furthermore, the U.S. Army has been operating fixed wing assets and providing an organic lift capability for the “last tactical mile” for over 50 years. In a letter sent to the defense committees in 2007, the Army vice chief of staff and the chief of the National Guard Bureau wrote, “[The JCA] is not a new mission for the Army ... and is perfectly in line with our responsibilities under Title X.” During the Vietnam War the Army fulfilled this hub and spoke resupply mission with the C-7/CV-2 Caribou aircraft.
Other arguments center on the cost of the C-27J and the actual number of runways it can access. The fact is the C-27J is a two-engine cousin of the four-engine C-130J, having the same engines and a similar avionics system. The unit acquisition costs for the C-27J are approximately half of the C-130. In addition, with only two engines, the C-27J has a reduced operating cost. The Pentagon’s own internal studies show that the majority of theater airlift missions performed in Iraq and Afghanistan were flown with two or fewer pallets of cargo and could thus be effectively performed more efficiently by the JCA. The JCA was always envisioned as a cost-effective alternative to handle these missions as a way to supplement, not replace C-130 capability.
In a 2007 memo, the Army told the defense committees that the C-27J could land on approximately 8,000 more runways than the C-130J. According to the General Aviation Manufacturers Association in its 2008 annual report, there are nearly 20,000 civil, public and private airports with paved and unpaved surfaces in the United States. This versatility makes the C-27J uniquely suited to operate in the homeland defense role. Its short field landing and ability to take off from unimproved sites would allow immediate access to hurricanebattered cities, flooded areas and fire-ravaged neighborhoods to deliver supplies, tools, equipment, vehicles, food and water.
Finally, the Quadrennial Roles and Missions report (QRMR), provided to the Congress in January 2009, and signed by Secretary Gates, stated in no uncertain terms “the Department had determined service responsibilities for intratheater airlift operations were appropriately aligned, and the option that provided the most value to the joint force was to assign the C-27J to both the Air Force and Army.” Throughout the hearings, witnesses have testified that the future of the program will be sorted out during the Quadrennial Defense Review. With the way in which the QRMR results and the requirements validation were summarily dismissed, it is easy to understand how some would be concerned that this current decision could prejudice any QDR results.
Testimony to date indicates the requirement for the JCA program has not changed. The arguments put forth for changing the program do not appear to be supported by a wide body of information available. Our warfighters need to be equipped with the right tools and the C-27J offers that needed capability, and I would strongly encourage the secretary to revisit this decision. ♦